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SECURING CONNECTED AND AUTONOMOUS ELECTRIC VEHICLE (CAEV) 
FLEETS BY ENFORCING AUTHORIZED CHARGING 
 





Provided herein are techniques for using charging events of connected, autonomous 
and electric vehicles (CAEVs) as an enforcement point in which an owner/operator of a 
vehicle gives authorization to the vehicle to proceed with the charging, and hence continue 
operating normally. Such techniques can be utilized for fleets of CAEVs. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
The automotive industry is undergoing several major developments simultaneously: 
connectivity, electrification, and autonomous driving. These changes are at different 
maturity levels and each of them is occurring at its own pace.  However, it is forecast that 
together these changes will reshape the mobility landscape. One common prediction 
involves the emergence of large fleets of connected, autonomous and electric vehicles 
(CAEVs) that people can utilize on-demand, similar to current taxicab or ride share 
services. 
When this future is realized, the owners and operators of CAEV fleets will need to 
protect them. While taxicabs today might be subject to stealing or plain vandalism, for 
most people, the presence of a driver is a deterrent. Autonomous vehicles, however, have 
no driver.  
Proposed herein is a solution that can be utilized to significantly deter people from 
stealing CAEVs.  Refueling internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles is a relatively 
simple process since, essentially, one refills the gasoline tank of a vehicle with liquid fuel, 
which typically takes just a few minutes. In contrast, charging the battery of an electric 
vehicle is slightly more involved. This is because lithium-ion batteries are quite sensitive 
to charging conditions. They typically cannot accept overcharging or trickle charging. 
Prolonged charging at too high a voltage can even cause the lithium-ion cells to catch fire, 
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so safety devices must interrupt charging in such instances. Additionally, charging to less 
than a full charge (say 80%) is recommended, as it prolongs the life of the battery. 
Protocols have been developed that provide for an On Board Charger (OBC) to 
continuously update a charging station with the battery state. Charging also takes 
significantly longer than refueling. 
The battery in an electric vehicle is the single most expensive element of the car. It 
is obviously an essential part, because without it the vehicle cannot move. Since the battery 
is large and heavy, for stability reasons, its installation is typically spread across the entire 
bottom part of a vehicle. All of these factors make the battery for a CAEV a critical 
component that is not easily accessible or replaceable. 
Techniques herein provide for utilizing the hi-tech nature of electric vehicle (EV) 
charging as an enforcement point to deter theft. That is, whenever an EV needs to recharge, 
it must receive explicit permission to do so from an authorized party. In the case of a vehicle 
fleet, the authorizing party would be the fleet owner or operator. 
Such techniques may be implemented as follows: when a vehicle connects to a 
charging station, it can send its Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) plus a random 
challenge. In response, the authorized party signs the VIN plus random challenge 
combination using a strong cryptographic Public-key (PK) signature. Finally, the vehicle 
verifies the signature, and if the signature is OK, the vehicle proceeds to charge the battery.  
In some instance, other information such as date, time, etc. may be utilized in the process.  
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Utilizing techniques proposed herein may create a strong deterrent against stealing 
fleet vehicles; since, as soon as their batteries are drained, they can no longer drive. Of 
course, one can always steal a vehicle by loading it onto a truck, but this is certainly more 
cumbersome than driving away with the vehicle itself.  Furthermore, the most valuable 
asset of the vehicle becomes useless, unless it is removed or taken apart, a doable but rather 
complicated procedure. 
There may be other events in an EV's life cycle that can be used for verifying with 
its operator or owner whether it can continue operating normally. Still, charging events 
provide a very convenient, simple, and safe opportunity for such enforcement. First, the 
cadence of charging events is advantageous - they occur often enough to provide good 
security but do not occur too often. For comparison, consider the alternative of using 
startup events as a potential theft deterrent. Usually, vehicle startup events happen at least 
once a day and often more. This can create an unnecessary extra burden on the security 
system. Second, when a vehicle starts operating, it may be temporarily outside cellular 
coverage, e.g., if it was parked in an underground basement.  Thus, it might be difficult for 
the vehicle to determine whether connectivity is maliciously jammed or temporarily 
blocked.  At other times, e.g., when the vehicle is in motion, it might be dangerous to apply 
sanctions. Thus, the EV would have to mark for itself whether it is in a suspicious state and 
defer potential sanctions for a later time.  More generally, adding a new device whose main 
purpose and function is to enforce security, like immobilizers, often results in a design that 
can be bypassed. 
In contrast, when a CAEV is charging, it is connected by wire, and a data-exchange 
is already present as the vehicle typically sends updates on its battery status between the 
EV's OBC and the charging-station. As was explained above, this connectivity is required 
for safe and efficient charging, i.e., there is no need to add anything for improved security 
enforcement.  Further, it is unlikely that charging-stations will not have network 
connectivity. 
As usual with security countermeasures, careful implementation of the feature is 
important. For example, if the Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that implement the 
charging authorization procedure can be easily reprogrammed, replaced or bypassed using 
some other method, then the feature may be less effective. Integration of the security 
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protocol into the OBC may help to overcome this potential issue, as it is often difficult 
(though probably not impossible) to bypass protocols integrated into the OBC. 
In summary, techniques are provided herein that utilize charging events of CAEVs 
as an enforcement point in which an owner/operator of a vehicle gives authorization to the 
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